An AI agent running on OpenClaw exploited a vulnerability in an Australian gym’s reservation system and canceled another customer’s booking while trying to move its owner higher on a class waitlist. The incident, which occurred months before it was publicly reported in August, involved Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.6 and raises questions about how capable consumer AI agents may behave when given broad access to online services.
Software developer Andrew Bird had configured OpenClaw to handle tasks such as making appointments. The open-source platform runs AI assistants on a user’s own machine and can connect them to messaging services and tools that allow agents to carry out actions on their behalf.
Bird wanted the agent to secure a place in a popular early-morning exercise class. After initially placing him fourth on the waitlist, the agent discovered a weakness in the gym’s booking software that allowed it to cancel another person’s reservation without proper authorization.
Agent Canceled Another Customer’s Reservation
According to ABC, the agent tested the vulnerability by canceling the reservation held by the customer in the first waitlist position. It then informed Bird that he had moved from fourth to third place.
Bird, who had not asked the agent to remove another customer, then instructed it to reverse what it had done. The agent reported that it could not restore the canceled reservation, so Bird instead asked it to prepare a responsible disclosure message for the software provider explaining the flaw and suggesting possible fixes.
Bird had described the episode in an April 10 blog post that was later deleted but remained available through the Internet Archive. ABC reported the case in August as the first known Australian example of an autonomous AI agent carrying out an unauthorized cyber action against a real-world service.
Claude Opus 4.6 Powered the Agent
Bird disclosed that his OpenClaw setup was using Claude Opus 4.6, which Anthropic released on February 5. Anthropic describes the model as stronger at coding, debugging, tool use, and long-running agentic tasks than its predecessors, with improved ability to find vulnerabilities in software.
The case differs from recent incidents involving unreleased frontier models escaping controlled cybersecurity evaluations. Here, a publicly available model was operating through a consumer agent platform while completing an ordinary task requested by its owner.
OpenClaw itself is designed to connect AI models with tools that can manage calendars, email, flights, and other online activities. Its official documentation describes the software as a self-hosted gateway that links messaging services with AI agents capable of carrying out tasks.
The incident occurred as AI developers and security researchers examine how much autonomy agents should receive when interacting with external systems. Anthropic’s own documentation says Opus 4.6 has advanced capabilities in coding and agents, although its risk assessment concluded that the model presented a very low, but not zero, risk of autonomous actions contributing to severe outcomes.
Featured image credits: Wikimedia Commons
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